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Abstract
This article provides an overview of how the G3 (USA, the euro area and 
Japan) and Asian emerging markets (EM Asia) have fared following the 
outbreak of the ﬁnancial crisis in 2008. The article shows that EM Asia weath-
ered the crisis much better than the G3 for a number of reasons. First, EM 
Asia had little direct exposure to the failed ﬁnancial institutions and it was 
therefore 'only' hit indirectly through a sharp decline in trade and through a 
rise in ﬁnancial market turmoil. Second, leading EM Asian nations adopted 
government stimulus packages that in many cases were bolder than in the 
G3, which helped to cushion the sharp decline in exports. Third, as a result 
of the reforms following the Asian crisis, EM Asia had healthy government 
ﬁnances and signiﬁcant foreign exchange reserves, which also helped. Because 
the ﬁnancial crisis was triggered by the bursting of a housing bubble in the 
USA, the article also analyses the extent to which the same could happen in 
China, where house prices again are rising. Finally, the article discusses the 
new activist monetary policy in Japan that aims to bring an end to deﬂation.1 
Keywords: financial crisis, government stimulus, recovery, future challenges
Introduction
This article provides an overview of how the global economy has fared 
following the ﬁnancial crisis that culminated in September 2008 with 
the crash of Lehman Brothers. The article ﬁrst outlines the adjustment 
of the USA, the euro area, and Japan (the G3 economies) and then fol-
lows an analysis of the emerging market economies in Asia (EM Asia) 
with a particular emphasis on China, India and Asean-4 (Indonesia, 
Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia).
The research here shows that EM Asia weathered the ﬁnancial crisis 
much better than the G3 regardless of which parameter we look at. The 
G3 had for example a sharp decline in gross domestic product (GDP) 
whereas the large EM Asian countries only had a slowdown in economic 
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growth. Some of the small and very open Asian economies also went 
into recession, but EM Asia is today far ahead of where it was when the 
crisis struck. In the same vein, EM Asia suffered only a minor increase 
in unemployment whereas the G3 as a group has high unemployment. 
The most battered area is southern Europe, with Spain reporting 26 per 
cent economy-wide unemployment and more than 50 per cent youth 
unemployment. This situation is a direct threat to social stability and to 
the survival of the euro and therefore also poses signiﬁcant risks to EM 
Asia's exports to Europe. Due to the much better performance of EM 
Asia, the rise in government budget deﬁcits has also been much smaller, 
whereas all G3 countries have signiﬁcant deﬁcit and debt problems. 
The marked difference in the adjustment to the crisis reﬂects a number 
of factors. First, the crisis was made in the USA and Europe and not in 
Asia. The initial shock was therefore smaller in Asia as these countries had 
little direct exposure to the failed ﬁnancial institutions and toxic assets. 
EM Asia was 'only' hit indirectly through a sharp decline in exports and 
capital inﬂows and through a signiﬁcant rise in ﬁnancial market turmoil. 
Second, leading EM Asian nations adopted government stimulus pack-
ages that in many cases were bolder than in the G3 nations (IMF 2013a). 
This is certainly the case for China. The strong countercyclical ﬁscal policy 
combined with highly accommodative monetary policy helped EM Asia 
cushion the sharp decline in exports, which in many cases amounted to 
more than a 50 per cent decline (quarter-on-quarter, annualized rate). 
Third, as a result of the reforms following the Asian crisis, these countries 
had healthy government ﬁnances and considerable foreign exchange 
reserves, which also helped them to weather the storm. 
Following the outline of how these economies have fared, the article 
goes on to discuss two policy issues in Asia of high importance to the 
rest of the world as well. Because the crisis was triggered by the burst-
ing of a housing bubble, we discuss whether and to what extent the 
same could happen in China where housing prices are elevated. Next 
we analyse the new activist monetary policy in Japan that aims to bring 
an end to deﬂation and restore the Japanese economy after more than 
two lost decades. 
The next section brieﬂy outlines key characteristics of the ﬁnancial 
crisis. The third section outlines the adjustment of the G3 and the fourth 
section analyses how EM Asia has weathered the crisis. The ﬁfth sec-
tion analyses current issues, including elevated housing prices in China 
and the new Japanese macroeconomic strategy. The last section brieﬂy 
concludes the paper.
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The Financial Crisis:  
Overconﬁdence and the Collapse of Housing Prices
The roots of the crisis go back to a long period of low interest rates and 
excessive risk taking spurred by new ﬁnancial products that allowed 
homeowners, banks and investors to borrow extensively without a 
solid backing of equity capital. When the crisis struck, a large number 
of ﬁnancial institutions had too little equity capital. Governments there-
fore had to bail them out and many investors had to deleverage quickly 
through ﬁre sales of assets. All of this led to a further downturn in asset 
prices and the economy.2
In response to the 2001 recession, the US Federal Reserve reduced the 
Federal Funds Rate to 1 per cent, down from 5.5 per cent prior to the 
recession. The Federal Reserve's interest rate cuts led a global monetary 
policy easing trend, reﬂecting that other countries were also hit by the 
downturn in the USA. Moreover, as the world economy operated with 
very little inﬂation pressure due to the integration of China into the 
global supply chain, central banks could maintain low interest rates 
over a longer period than what is normal. 
There is little doubt that this is an important explanation of the sharp 
run-up in house prices in almost all advanced economies. On top of 
this, ﬁnancial institutions undertook a number of innovations that 
made it possible to buy real estate with a very small down payment, if 
any at all. The problem with these innovations became obvious in the 
US sub-prime market in late 2006 and early 2007. The sub-prime loans 
were often given in anticipation that house prices would continue to 
rise. In many cases the loans were so-called 'teaser loans' with low and 
even negative repayments at the beginning of the loan.3 The idea was 
that even though many of the new homeowners could not afford to 
buy a house, rising house prices would eventually solve that problem. 
However, as house prices started to ﬂatten out in the fall of 2006 and 
later nosedive (Figure 1), many sub-prime borrowers could no longer 
service their debt and delinquency rates rose to unprecedented levels. 
This marked the beginning of the global ﬁnancial crisis.
In the sub-prime segment, delinquency rates rose to almost 30 per cent. 
Investors who had purchased these mortgage loans, often securitized, 
therefore started to report large losses. These investors were mainly 
US and European banks and pension funds. Interestingly, large credi-
tors of the US trade deﬁcit, including China and Japan, had very little 
exposure to these assets. These countries were mainly investing in US 
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government bonds, which explains why EM Asia, to a large extent, was 
not directly affected by the ﬁnancial crisis. However, as a result of the 
large losses in the US and European ﬁnancial institutions, credit started 
to dry up and several banks, including Merrill Lynch and Bear Stearns, 
came under severe pressure and were close to collapsing when they were 
FIGURE 2: The US Stock Market: Crash and Recovery of the S&P 500
Source: Bloomberg (2013).
FIGURE 1: US Boom and Bust Housing Prices in the 20 Largest Cities
Source: S&P Case-Shiller (2013).
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taken over by Bank of America and JPMorgan, respectively.4 This was, 
however, only the beginning of the crisis as it turned out that it was 
not only the sub-prime but also the prime market that was in trouble. 
Fannie Mae (Federal National Mortgage Association) and Freddy Mac 
(Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation), the biggest lenders in the 
prime market, therefore started to report huge losses on their books. 
This explains why the world's largest mortgage institutions later were 
rescued by the US Treasury. 
Other ﬁnancial institutions were also under water. AIG, the world's 
largest insurance company, had extended its business into complex risk 
products, which led to large losses as well. The US Treasury decided to 
rescue AIG in September 2008 to avoid larger, systemic consequences. 
Increasing stress in ﬁnancial markets led to soaring interbank interest rates. 
The decision by the US authorities not to rescue Lehman in order to avoid 
excessive moral hazard came as a shock to markets. The Lehman collapse 
on 15 September 2008 triggered a sharp decline in conﬁdence as the whole 
banking sector realized that it could no longer be sure that the authorities 
would step in and save even systemically important institutions. This trig-
gered massive ﬁre sales of stocks, and from 15 September 2008 and until 
the market bottomed out on 6 March 2009, the S&P 500 declined by no less 
than 46 per cent (see Figure 2). Moreover, as other countries also suffered 
from their own ﬁnancial crises, rooted in losses at home or abroad, we had 
a full blown international ﬁnancial crisis, the worst since 1929.
Adjustment by the G3 to the Financial Crisis
As a result of a near collapse of ﬁnancial markets and the ensuing credit 
crunch, advanced economies went into deep recessions. The sharp de-
cline in economic activity set in from Q2 2008 and lasted until Q1 2009 
(see Figure 3).
The downward spiralling of the G3 economies was ampliﬁed by the 
banking sector's desperate need for cash, which not only led to a sud-
den stop in credit ﬂows but also to ﬁre sales of stocks. According to 
Eichengreen and O'Rourke (2009) stock markets, industrial production 
and global trade were diving faster from summer 2008 to spring 2009 
than during 1929-1930. The signiﬁcant decline in global trade was a 
strong blow to EM Asia since this region had become the world's leader 
in production and export of manufactured goods.
Plummeting asset prices and a fast contraction in production and 
trade had the potential to trigger a 1930-like depression but due to ef-
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fective policies, the majority of advanced economies escaped this sce-
nario, though not all. The GDP in Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain has 
continued to decline and these countries are now struggling with mass 
unemployment. In the case of Spain, the general unemployment rate 
stands at 26 per cent and youth unemployment exceeds 50 per cent. In 
Greece, the worst affected country, GDP is down by more than 20 per 
cent. Southern Europe was ill prepared when the crisis struck due to 
structural problems, including signiﬁcant competitiveness problems. 
To avoid a repeat of the 1930s, central banks were quick to cut interest 
rates and they also injected massive amounts of liquidity into money 
markets. By the end of 2008, leading interest rates in the G3 countries 
were cut to emergency levels, where they have stayed since then. Gov-
ernments soon followed course by undertaking ﬁscal stimulus packages, 
which mitigated the consequences of the sharp contraction in private 
sector demand. Table 1 summarizes key features of the countercyclical 
ﬁscal policy in leading nations, including China. We shall later get into 
more detail with China's efforts in this area.
Due to the countercyclical policies, the majority of the advanced econo-
mies slowly began to recover in Q2, 2009 (see Figure 3). The recovery has, 
however, been much weaker than what is normally observed following 
recessions due to deleveraging that has led consumers to hold back on 
spending in order to rebuild their ﬁnancial wealth. This also explains why 
companies have been reluctant to undertake new investments. 
FIGURE 3: Real GDP for USA, Japan and Euro Area, 2008 (Q2=100)
Source: Eurostat (2013).
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As a consequence of the signiﬁcant decline in GDP, government tax 
revenue has fallen in all economies. Moreover, as stimulus policies en-
acted into law in 2008 and 2009 were costly, government deﬁcits shot 
up (see Table 2).
TABLE 2: Government Deﬁcits in the G3, 2007-2012 (in % of GDP)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
USA -2.7 -6.7 -13.3 -11.2 -10.0 -8.5
Euro Area -0.7 -2.1 -6.4 -6.2 -4.1 -3.6
Japan -2.1 -4.1 -10.4 -9.4 -9.9 -10.2
Source: IMF (2013c).
TABLE 1: Fiscal Stimulus Packages 
Country Size of plan Breakdown Comments
USA
5.5% of GDP
US$787 
billion
Spending by federal government: 
$ 95 billion 
Transfer to local government: 
$ 279 billion 
Transfer to individuals through 
social security, unemployment 
insurance, food stamps: $ 127 
billion
Tax cuts: $ 286 billion
Most of the plan 
was implemented 
in 2009. US ﬁscal 
policy has been 
contractionary since 
2010.
China
14% of GDP
US$586 
billion/
RMB 4220 
billion
Infrastructure: 38%
Earthquake reconstruction: 25% 
Welfare: 10%
Rural development: 9% 
Technology advancement: 9% 
Green energy: 5%
 Education: 4%
To be spent 2008-
2010. Below we 
discuss the IMF's 
estimate of the 
effects on GDP 
growth.
Japan
6.4% of GDP
Yen 32,400 
billion
A series of stimulus plans in 2009-
2011: Government spending on a 
wide range of projects. Tax cuts 
designed to boost spending and 
employment support. In addition, 
loan guarantees for companies not 
included.
Japan has since 
2011 undertaken 
additional ﬁscal 
stimulus plans not 
included in the 
6.4%, cf. later.
Germany
3.0% of GDP 
€82 billion
Investment in infrastructure and 
tax reductions.
Two packages to be 
spent in 2008 and 
2009.
Note: For the USA and Germany: OECD (2009) is the source. For Japan, I use IMF (2010a) since 
the OECD's numbers only include policies up to March 2009 and since Japan, unlike the USA 
and Germany, has implemented several packages after that date. China is covered by IMF 
(2010b) and Financial Times. 
Sources: OECD (2009); IMF (2010a); IMF (2010b); Financial Times (2009a, 2009b). 
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The sharp increase in budget deﬁcits meant that public debt started 
spiralling upward (see Table 3). The US debt burden is up by almost 40 
percentage points since the crisis struck. Interestingly, euro area debt is up 
by less than 30 percentage points but the debt problem is highly uneven 
and reﬂects to a signiﬁcant extent the crisis in southern Europe. Japan's 
government debt has reached an unprecedented level but is entirely a 
domestic issue as all the debt is held by Japanese citizens. The Japanese 
situation is, however, unsustainable. The IMF (2013d) notes that Japan 
needs to cut its deﬁcit by no less than 11 per cent of GDP in order to put 
debt-to-GDP ﬁrmly on a declining path (see also the last section).
TABLE 3: Government Gross Debt Burdens in the G3, 2007-2012  
(in % of GDP)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
USA 67.2 76.1 89.7 98.6 102.5 106.5
Euro Area 66.4 70.2 80.0 85.4 88.1 92.9
Japan 183.0 191.8 210.2 215.3 230.3 237.9
Source: IMF (2013c).
Since 2009, the G3 countries have aimed at rolling back ﬁscal deﬁcits. 
In spite of this, debt burdens will continue to increase over the coming 
years due to deﬁcits and weak growth. As a result of the belt tightening, 
ﬁscal policy is now reducing spending in the G3 as a whole, which in 
part explains why the recovery has had difﬁculty taking off (see IMF 
2012 for a discussion). 
In addition to the negative growth effect of the tight ﬁscal policies, 
companies have been reluctant to invest because of a bleak outlook, 
including high uncertainty about the future. The risk that the USA was 
going to fall over the ﬁscal cliff at the end of 2012 weighed heavily on 
the business outlook; the euro crisis has also taken its toll, in particular 
after the debt sustainability of Spain and Italy came into doubt follow-
ing the bailout of a number of smaller member states including Greece, 
Portugal and Ireland. As the distrust in Spain and Italy's public ﬁnances 
accelerated in 2011, interest rates rose to more than 7 per cent, which 
in view of the declining GDP and high debt, is unsustainable. The debt 
crisis led to a double-dip recession in Europe. Preliminary evidence 
suggests, however, that the euro area may have just escaped recession 
in the second quarter of 2013.
The euro crisis has also led to speculation about the future of the 
euro. It is widely agreed that the survival of the euro in its present form 
is highly dependent on developments in Italy and Spain. If policies in 
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these countries fail to achieve debt sustainability and maintain sup-
port by the general public, these countries could end up in a default, 
which most likely would lead to a break-up of the monetary union in 
its present form.
The risk of this scenario has, however, been reduced signiﬁcantly over 
the short term by the infamous European Central Bank (ECB) announce-
ment in 2012: 'We will do whatever it takes to save the euro', signalling 
that the ECB was now willing to act as the lender of last resort. As a 
result of this, Italian and Spanish interest rates plummeted and it became 
much cheaper for these countries to fund their large deﬁcits.
In the medium and longer term, however, the task is still the same: 
Italy and Spain must bring their debt burdens on a sustainable path, 
which is challenging for countries that continue to be in recession 
and that can only improve competitiveness through wage restraint. 
Whether the large Mediterranean countries will manage to solve these 
problems within the framework of a common currency in Europe is 
still uncertain.
What is not uncertain is the negative effect the euro crisis has had on 
the rest of the world, including EM Asia. As noted by JPMorgan (2013b), 
exports out of EM Asia to Europe in 2013 are back to the level recorded 
in 2010. A collapse of the euro area is therefore also considered to be 
the most important external risk for China (see IMF 2013b).
Before we turn to EM Asia, let us ﬁnally add a few observations on 
the US ﬁscal policy issue. The US ﬁscal imbalances have been addressed 
in two steps. First, Congress agreed at the end of December 2012 to 
raise the income tax on high earners and to discontinue the payroll tax 
cut. These policy changes took effect at the beginning of 2013 and are 
estimated to withdraw around 0.5-1.0 percentage points of GDP. It was 
then agreed to embark on a wider overhaul of the budget in the ﬁrst 
months of 2013. However, since the parties have not been able to reach 
agreement, automatic spending cuts were rolled out 1 March 2013. 
Within this ﬁscal year these cuts will amount to withdrawing about 0.5 
of a percentage point of GDP growth. At present, the US ﬁscal stance 
is therefore estimated to reduce economic growth by around 1.0-1.5 
percentage points.
The risk that this could get ampliﬁed through private consumption 
cutbacks has so far not materialized as consumers have been resilient, 
reﬂecting signiﬁcant wealth effects following strong gains in stocks and 
house prices (JPMorgan 2013a). The strong rebound in asset prices is 
likely, to a large extent, to reﬂect the Federal Reserve's QE3 programme, 
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which amounts to buying mortgage bonds worth USD 85 billion every 
month. This programme helps to keep long-term interest rates down, 
which stimulates the recovery in the housing market (see Figure 1). This 
programme also spurs the stock market by making stocks more attractive 
for investors. The activist monetary policy is therefore an important pil-
lar in the recovery as the ﬁscal stance will withdraw spending from the 
economy regardless of how Congress decides on the budget. Because of 
the importance of the USA in the global economy, US monetary policy is 
therefore also of great importance for EM Asia (see also the discussion 
below on Indonesia and India). 
Adjustment by EM Asia to the Financial Crisis
Because the ﬁnancial crisis was made in the USA and Europe and 
not in EM Asia, and because EM Asia had little direct exposure to the 
distressed banks and toxic assets, EM Asia was 'only' hit indirectly by 
the crisis. The main channels were through a sharp decline in trade and 
capital ﬂows and through a signiﬁcant rise in ﬁnancial market turmoil. 
This section explains how EM Asia tackled the signiﬁcant blow to its 
exports and in many cases actually managed to grow during the global 
downturn.
Source: IMF (2013b).
FIGURE 4: Real GDP for China and India (2008=100)
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We begin by looking at the two largest economies: China and India. 
Together they account for more than 70 per cent of GDP in EM Asia. 
Due to their size, the adjustment of these economies is of immense 
importance to the whole region, reﬂecting the strong intra-Asia supply 
networks and trade links.
Let us take a helicopter perspective and look at annual data that 
smooth out quarterly changes. It is obvious that the two largest econo-
mies weathered the ﬁnancial crisis much better than the G3 (see Figure 
4), as both China and India posted signiﬁcantly higher GDP in 2009 than 
in 2008. For both countries, however, there is a tendency for growth 
to trend downward. This is most obvious for India. India is currently 
growing at about 5 per cent, signiﬁcantly below pre-crisis levels. Chi-
na's growth has also come down, as shown by the straight GDP line in 
Figure 4 (a straight line signals declining growth unlike an exponential 
curve signalling constant growth). China is currently targeting an an-
nual growth rate of 7.5 per cent.
In comparison to China and India, the smaller and more open Asean-4 
economies of Malaysia and Thailand were hit much harder by the down-
turn. It took them about a year to recoup the initial loss in GDP. The 
other two Asean-4 countries, Indonesia and the Philippines, fared better 
and suffered only a minor decline in GDP growth (see Figure 5).
FIGURE 5: Real GDP for Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and 
Thailand (2008=100)
Source: IMF (2013b).
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The transmission of the crisis to Asia came to a large extent through 
trade. The deep crisis in the G3 triggered a sharp contraction in the de-
veloped world's imports of goods produced in EM Asia and elsewhere. 
China, the world's largest exporter, saw its exports plummet close to 40 
per cent in Q4 2008 relative to Q3 (annualized rate; see Figure 6). The 
downturn accelerated in Q1 2009 with exports declining by almost 50 
per cent relative to Q4 2008 (annualized rate). 
As noted by Eichengreen and O'Rourke (2009), global trade declined 
faster in this period than during the crisis in the late 1920s and early 
1930s. Because a signiﬁcant part of China's exports is re-export of proc-
essed imported intermediate goods, imports declined by almost the same 
percentage as exports. However, since China was running a big trade 
surplus, the sharp contraction in trade had a strong negative effect on the 
Chinese economy. In addition, falling exports also meant lower produc-
tivity growth as the export sector is leading relative to sectors producing 
only for the home market, including agriculture and services.
To ﬁll the signiﬁcant gap in aggregate demand, the Chinese govern-
ment enacted into law a bold stimulus package outlined in Table 1. 
Within this framework, China's investment grew at an unprecedented 
rate. According to the IMF (2010b), China's investments grew by 20 per 
cent in 2009, which is double the annual average of the last three decades. 
FIGURE 6: China's Export and Import Growth (quarter-on-quarter 
annualized rate)
Source: WTO (2013).
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Investments were particularly strong in infrastructure, rising by 44 per 
cent in 2009. This expansion was by and large ﬁnanced by issuing bonds 
and by bank credit. Real estate investments also gradually picked up in 
2009 and investment in the manufacturing sector increased by 30 per 
cent, despite a signiﬁcant decline in exports. The surge in investment 
contributed with an unprecedented 8 percentage points to GDP growth 
in 2009 (IMF 2010b).
The bold size of the intervention combined with highly accommoda-
tive monetary policy shows that China gave its economy the biggest 
boost to demand among the leading nations. By adopting this giant 
investment plan, China also changed strategy from being primarily an 
export-led economy to an investment-driven economy.
China's countercyclical policy had a number of important effects. First, 
it helped to cushion the adverse trade shock on the Chinese economy, 
including avoiding a recession. In spite of that, many small and medium-
sized businesses outside the state-owned sector came into difﬁculties 
and many went bankrupt or had to seek emergency ﬁnancing from non-
ofﬁcial sources. This marks the beginning of extensive shadow banking 
in China. Second, the activist policy also quickly led to a rebound in 
China's imports. The strong import recovery beneﬁtted not only neigh-
bouring Asian economies but also the rest of the world including com-
modity exporters Australia, Brazil, Chile and several African countries. 
China's import recovery is a reﬂection of its bold stimulus policy and 
of the strong countercyclical policy in the G3, which allowed China to 
resume its export activities. Without a rebound of exports out of China, 
we could not have had a strong recovery of China's imports.
The signiﬁcant demand boost in China and the G3 helped the smaller 
EM Asian nations recover from essentially a free fall in trade in late 2008 
and early 2009. Figure 7 shows how Malaysia's trade plummeted by 
more than 60 per cent in Q4 2008 (quarter-on-quarter annualized rate). 
Figure 7 also shows that Thailand's external trade was hit very hard 
with a decline in imports in Q1 2009 of around 80 per cent (annualized 
rate). Thailand's trade was hit much harder during the ﬁnancial crisis 
than during the ﬂooding in late 2011.
In addition to the stimulus efforts by China, many of the other Asian 
economies also adopted countercyclical policies that helped to smooth 
out the adjustment process. In a study of how the Asian economies 
adjusted to the crisis, the IMF concludes that: 
In the last decade, most Asian economies have pursued more countercyclical 
ﬁscal policies than in the 1980s and 1990s. In the aftermath of the 2008-
92 ____________________ The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 31(2)•2013
Ole Risager ________________________________________________________________
09 global ﬁnancial crisis, for example, policymakers took several ﬁscal 
measures to cushion the downturn, in contrast with the 1997-98 Asian crisis. 
…Econometric analysis…ﬁnds that when real GDP per capita declined by 1 
percentage point relative to its trend, real government expenditure per capita 
increased on average by 1 percentage point, versus only 0.3 percentage point 
for the period 1980-2011. (IMF 2013a: 38)
Following the implementation of these stimulus policies, EM Asia 
went through a strong recovery that later led to a signiﬁcant pick-up in 
inﬂation. That triggered a tightening of monetary policy in several EM 
Asia economies. This was certainly the case in China where consumer 
price inﬂation peaked at around 7 per cent in 2011. China tightened 
monetary policy through increases in the banking sector's reserve re-
quirements, interest rate hikes and through decrees to the banking sec-
tor to limit credit growth. In addition, China also implemented various 
policies that directly aimed at cooling a hot real estate market. These 
policies eventually reversed the upward trend in inﬂation, which is now 
hovering slightly below 3 per cent in China. India, however, is still strug-
gling with excessive inﬂation near double-digit levels and with a real 
economy that has had difﬁculty in taking off since the crisis struck.
EM Asia as a whole managed to weather the crisis without creating 
large government deﬁcits. Fiscal deﬁcits are on average close to 2 per 
cent of GDP. These deﬁcits are matched by current account surpluses 
FIGURE 7: Malaysia and Thailand's External Trade Growth (quarter-
on-quarter annualized rate) 
Source: WTO (2013).
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of roughly the same size. These economies continue therefore to be in a 
strong macroeconomic position as they have modest government debt 
burdens and sizeable foreign exchange reserves. 
But not all Asian countries are in an equally strong macroeconomic 
position. India suffers from persistent high inﬂation (close to 10 per 
cent), a government deﬁcit around 5 per cent of GDP and a current ac-
count deﬁcit of about the same magnitude. Indonesia is also running 
a sizeable current account deﬁcit and Indonesia therefore also needs 
to import capital to ﬁnance the current account deﬁcit. In periods of 
ﬁnancial market turbulence and distress, capital importing countries 
are vulnerable to changes in sentiment among foreign investors. The 
considerable outﬂow of capital from both India and Indonesia over the 
summer of 2013 illustrates this point. In response to the discussion in 
the USA of reducing the Federal Reserve's QE3 programme, which most 
likely would raise interest rates, both countries suffered from massive 
capital outﬂows as US-based investors, including hedge funds, reduced 
their leverage. As a result, both India and Indonesia experienced double-
digit declines in the value of the rupee and rupiah, respectively. In both 
cases the central banks raised interest rates to stem the outﬂows and 
stabilize the ﬁnancial sector. The negative side effect is higher ﬁnancing 
costs for businesses and this affects in particular small and medium-
sized ﬁrms that export little to the rest of the world. These countries are 
therefore poised for lower growth for a while, that is, until the positive 
effect on exports starts to kick in.
As we shall later discuss the risk of a hard landing in China, it is 
worth noting that China's overall macro situation is favourable, with 
a current account surplus at 2.4 per cent in 2012, total external debt at 
only 9.1 per cent, and a government budget deﬁcit at 1.6 per cent (all 
in per cent of GDP). Moreover, China's stock of foreign reserves stood 
at USD 3.3 trillion at the end of 2012. Housing prices are elevated in 
major cities and pose risks to macroeconomic stability (see below). Lo-
cal government ﬁnances are often reported to be under stress in parts 
of China and the maturity of loans has also been extended in several 
cases to soften the debt service burden. That said, the transparency of 
local government ﬁnances is low. The same goes for the balance sheets 
of state-owned enterprises in general. The overall risk exposure of the 
government sector is therefore uncertain as there is no consolidated 
balance sheet that integrates all activities within the public sector.
From a global growth perspective, it should be noted that China 
alone has contributed with more than 40 per cent of global growth 
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since the outbreak of the ﬁnancial crisis (JPMorgan 2013b). That said, 
there is little doubt that China and EM Asia in general could have 
performed better without the double dip in Europe. The double dip 
is weighing heavily over the region as EM Asia's exports to the euro 
area have reverted to the 2010 level, which to a large extent explains 
why the growth contribution from net-trade in China is now hovering 
around zero, unlike in previous years where the trade sector was a 
driver of growth (JPMorgan 2013b). However, the decline in growth 
trend is also likely to reﬂect that the investment-led growth strategy 
ﬁnally has run into problems with diminishing returns after 30 years 
of double-digit GDP growth. Going forward, it is therefore also the 
government's strategy to rebalance the economy towards a higher 
share of consumption by expanding social security, health care and 
the welfare system.
Current Macroeconomic Policy Issues and Dilemmas in 
China and Japan
China weathered the crisis well and the government was therefore able 
to deliver on its key economic goals: growth and job creation. Indeed, 
it is common to argue that in the absence of democratic elections, the 
Chinese government derives its legitimacy from achieving satisfactory 
economic progress. Translated into hard numbers, the government has 
to deliver at least 7 per cent annual growth to maintain social stabil-
ity, according to conventional wisdom. It is in light of this overriding 
priority that one should understand the government's position taking 
in a number of policy issues and dilemmas.
In spite of the success in macroeconomic policy-making, growth is 
trending down. This also explains why the government has been reluctant 
to curb surging housing prices. As noted by the investment bank UBS in 
Financial Times (2009c): 'the leadership has a dilemma—they don't want 
a property bubble but at the same time they don't want to kill the sector 
and see property activity drop in the current weak environment.'
Figures 8 and 9 show that real estate prices in Beijing, Shenzhen and 
Shanghai have risen by double digits since late 2012. The surge in prices 
is hard to justify by fundamentals since the return from investing in 
real estate, deﬁned as the potential rent relative to the property value, 
is signiﬁcantly below bank interest rates. Citizens who buy apartments 
for investment purposes must therefore buy in anticipation they will 
continue to appreciate in value.5 As anecdotal evidence suggests, this 
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FIGURE 9: Price Development of Existing Residential Buildings, M12 
2010=100.
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (2013).
FIGURE 8: Price Development of Newly Constructed Residential 
Buildings, M12 2010=100
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (2013).
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motive is the dominating one for a large number of buyers and the 
housing market appears to be in bubble-like territory.
The government has taken steps to cool the market through restrictive 
lending practices in the regulated banking sector and by setting limits 
on how many apartments investors can buy, but these efforts have not 
been effective.6 The government's efforts are frustrated by extensive 
shadow banking, that is, by lending outside the ofﬁcial banking sys-
tem. According to the IMF, 'about half of ﬁnancial intermediation now 
takes place outside traditional banking channels in less well supervised 
parts of the ﬁnancial system' (IMF 2013a: 16). Moreover, the IMF ex-
presses concern over the rapid pace of credit growth. Recent data for 
the broadest measure of credit growth shows that credit growth rose 
by large double-digit numbers during the ﬁrst half of 2013. Because 
a fast growing share of this credit growth is ﬂowing through the less 
supervised banking system, it is likely that loan quality is declining.7 
Moreover, the fast credit expansion could very well fuel a further surge 
in real estate prices and eventually create a mega bubble in the market. 
The central bank therefore also hiked ﬁnancial conditions in June 2013 
in order to slow credit growth. In order to offset the negative effect on 
GDP growth, the government also announced a mini stimulus package 
with emphasis once again on infrastructure investments and on lowering 
taxes for small businesses. This intervention shows that the government 
is highly concerned about maintaining growth at or above the threshold 
needed to maintain social stability.
In a discussion of the likelihood and consequences of a hard land-
ing, triggered by a collapse of the housing market, it should be noted 
that the typical Chinese investor and homeowner is likely to be less 
indebted than US and European investors were prior to the outbreak 
of the ﬁnancial crisis. First time homeowners are, for example, asked 
by the bank to come up with 30 per cent down payment and for buyers 
of a second apartment, the down payment is much larger. However, in 
an economy with rapid credit growth there is little doubt that the loan-
to-value ratio is increasing, although the deep-rooted Chinese tradition 
of having large savings suggests that we are far from the household 
indebtedness in the West prior to the bursting of the bubble. Because 
of that, a signiﬁcant decline in real estate values in China is likely to 
have less dramatic effects on the economy as homeowners do not have 
to deleverage as much as they did in the West. It should also be noted 
that the Chinese government has an enormous self interest in prevent-
ing a hard landing since this could threaten its monopoly-power status 
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and endanger its privileges as hundreds of millions of citizens will be 
strongly affected because the housing market is where most citizens 
have parked their savings. Because the government also possesses a 
range of tools it can mobilize to steer the economy out of the worst 
scenarios, a hard landing seems fairly unlikely, at least over the next 
couple of years. Growth between 7 and 8 per cent seems therefore to 
be the most likely outcome (see also the projections by the IMF 2013b 
and Zhang and Zhang 2013). 
Let us turn to Japan and the remarkable policy change under the new 
Abe-led government. The new strategy has three components, labelled 
'arrows' in the jargon of Abenomics. The ﬁrst is a signiﬁcant quantitative 
and qualitative easing programme that promises to double the monetary 
base within two years.8 The goal is to hit a 2 per cent inﬂation target and 
end the deﬂation period of two lost decades. The second component 
is a new stimulus programme at JPY 10.3 trillion that aims at lifting 
GDP by 2 per cent while creating 600,000 new jobs. The third is a plan 
that aims to boost Japan's competitiveness through reforms in product 
and labour markets. The details of the third arrow have not yet been 
revealed in any great detail.
The strategy of the Abe government has been to restart Japan's 
economy through a big devaluation without triggering instability, 
including retaliation from other countries. As shown by Figure 10, the 
yen has also depreciated by around 25 per cent against the US dollar 
and the won since late 2012. This has helped to stimulate exports and 
the policy should therefore also provide a boost to Japan's economy, 
including inﬂation expectations. If the plan works as intended, it could 
also generate positive spill-overs to the whole region arising from a 
stronger Japan (see the IMF 2013d). Japan's new strategy was proposed 
years ago by Krugman (1998) and Bernanke (1999), but that was before 
the ballooning of the Japanese government debt.
There is evidence that the strategy has started to work. GDP rose by 
4.1 per cent in Q1 2013 and by 3.8 per cent in Q2 (annualized rates), 
lifted by stronger exports and private consumption. This has fuelled 
expectations of higher proﬁts, which explains the signiﬁcant increase 
in the stock market. Figure 10 shows that the stock market, from its 
trough on 13 November 2012 to its peak on 22 May 2013, is up by more 
than 70 per cent when measured in yen. Since then, the market has lost 
momentum and is actually drifting down a bit (Figure 10).9
Volatility in both stock and bond markets has, however, gone up, 
reﬂecting market nervousness about the outlook of the strategy. On 
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23 May, the Nikkei 225 fell by 7.3 per cent. The sell-off was apparently 
triggered by weak Chinese manufacturing data and the Fed's announce-
ment that the US QE3 programme could be scaled back soon provided 
the real economy continues to improve. The bond market has also been 
highly volatile. The Bank of Japan (BoJ) initially announced that the pro-
gramme would lower interest rates, thus pushing investors into riskier 
assets, including stocks. However, BoJ also said it aimed at 2 per cent 
inﬂation, which should lead to higher nominal interest rates. The result 
has been that interest rates have been volatile and it is still too early to 
detect a clear trend in the bond market. 
The development in interest rates medium to long term depends 
crucially on inﬂation and inﬂation expectations. The latest data on CPI 
inﬂation is for August 2013, and the data point to annual headline inﬂa-
tion of 0.8 per cent. Japan, however, is still stuck with deﬂation when 
energy and food prices are eliminated from the CPI, but preliminary 
evidence shows that core prices (excluding imported energy and food) 
have stopped falling as much as they did before. In other words, Japan's 
current inﬂation is not yet driven by higher domestic wages and salaries 
but reﬂects the big yen depreciation that has sent import prices up. For 
Japan's strategy to be successful and bring an end to deﬂation we need 
to see persistent increases in core prices driven by stronger wages and 
salaries. 
FIGURE 10: Indexes for JPY/USD, JPY/Won, and Nikkei 225 (M11 
2012=100).
Source: Bloomberg (2013).
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Let us then brieﬂy discuss a few risks to the strategy. A signiﬁcant 
rise in interest rates represents an important risk if not accompanied 
by a substantial and lasting improvement in economic growth. Rising 
interest rates weaken the banking sector's capital adequacy as it leads 
to declines in the value of banks' bond portfolios. As banks hold a 
signiﬁcant portion of the government's debt, the effect on the health of 
the banks' balance sheets should not be ignored. A rise in interest rates 
without a signiﬁcant improvement of the economy will also worsen 
the government's debt burden. If the discrepancy between the funding 
interest rate and the economy's growth only widens by 1 percentage 
point, the government's debt burden increases by 2.4 percentage points. 
This is implied by the formula for the change in the government debt 
burden. Recall, the change in the debt burden d(B/Y) equals the primary 
deﬁcit (G-T) as a per cent of GDP (Y) plus the interest rate (r) minus the 
economy's growth rate (g) times the debt burden (B/Y): d(B/Y)=[G-T]/Y 
+ [r-g](B/Y).10 With a debt burden at 238 per cent of GDP, a rise in (r-g) 
by 1 percentage point triggers an increase in the debt burden by 2.4 per-
centage points. In Japan's case it should also be noted that the primary 
deﬁcit stood at 9.3 per cent in 2012 (IMF 2013c), which adds further to 
an already ballooning debt burden. A vicious circle of increasing interest 
rates and falling bond prices could lead to difﬁculties for the govern-
ment in ﬁnancing its large deﬁcit and rolling over its huge debt now at 
close to 240 per cent of GDP. While this may seem unlikely in view of 
Japan's strong tradition of funding at home, it is striking that the new 
bond buying programme occasionally has been accompanied by a rise 
in bond yields showing that private investors willingly have reduced 
their positions in Japanese debt in spite of the BoJ's commitment to an 
unprecedented buying spree. If the strategy fails to achieve the desired 
macroeconomic effects one cannot rule out that investors will sell out 
of Japanese bonds and move into foreign bonds in response to a higher 
government default risk. 
Another risk is that other countries, including South Korea and Tai-
wan, will retaliate against the big Japanese yen depreciation as they to 
some extent compete for the same export markets.11 This is certainly 
the case in cars but also in many consumer electronics goods. Figure 
11 shows that Hyundai and Kia recently have had a poor stock market 
performance relative to Toyota's performance. Toyota's share price in 
late September 2013 is up by close to 60 per cent relative to January 2013. 
Kia and Hyundai are up by less than 20 per cent, a bit below Honda's 
development.  
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How is China affected by the big yen devaluation? China to some 
extent actually beneﬁts from the cheaper Japanese currency as China 
imports a considerable amount of Japanese intermediate goods that are 
processed and later re-exported. However, since China also competes 
with Japan in exports of consumer electronics, the net effect on China 
is ambiguous.
Retaliation could take place through counter devaluations, trade 
disputes and discrimination against Japanese companies when bidding 
for contracts, including public procurement.12 Because of the huge size 
of Japan's QE programme it is likely that there will be considerable 
capital outﬂows from Japan, which could spur elevated pricing in other 
markets, including Hong Kong's real estate market, which has doubled 
over the last four years and it could also make it harder for the Chinese 
authorities to rein in the extensive shadow banking due to potential hot 
money coming in from Japan.
The new strategy in Japan is therefore not without risks of destabiliz-
ing public ﬁnances at home and markets abroad. However, there is also a 
signiﬁcant upside potential assuming that the third arrow in the plan will 
effectively manage to reform Japan's labour and product markets. 
FIGURE 11: Toyota, Honda, Kia and Hyundai on Local Stock 
Exchanges (1 January 2013=100)
Source: Bloomberg (2013).
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Concluding Comments
This article has shown that EM Asia weathered the ﬁnancial crisis much 
better than the G3. EM Asia is today far ahead of where it was when 
the crisis struck. By contrast, the USA and Japan have only recently 
recouped the GDP loss in 2008-2009, whereas Europe is still below the 
pre-crisis level.
As a result of the better performance in EM Asia, the rise in govern-
ment budget deﬁcits has also been much smaller, whereas the G3 has 
signiﬁcant deﬁcit and debt problems. EM Asia as a region continues 
therefore to be in a strong macroeconomic position, with modest ﬁscal 
deﬁcits around 2 per cent of GDP matched by current account surpluses 
of about the same size and sizeable foreign exchange reserves. India and 
Indonesia stand out as exceptions. 
India has a government deﬁcit close to 5 per cent of GDP, a current-
account deﬁcit of about the same magnitude and suffers from inﬂation 
close to 10 per cent. Indonesia is also in a less favourable position, 
with a sizeable current account deﬁcit. Both countries are therefore in 
need of foreign ﬁnance and that makes them vulnerable to changes in 
foreign investor sentiment. Over the summer of 2013, India and Indo-
nesia suffered signiﬁcant capital outﬂows as foreign investors began to 
fear higher interest rates in the USA. The capital outﬂows led to sharp 
currency depreciations and defensive interest rate hikes by the central 
banks. The ﬁnancial turmoil and the hike in interest rates are likely to 
slow growth over the short term.
A key reason why EM Asia as a whole weathered the ﬁnancial crisis 
well reﬂects the reforms initiated in response to the 1997 Asian crisis. 
These reforms led to a build-up of considerable foreign exchange reserves 
and to healthy government budgets that allowed EM Asia to implement 
bold countercyclical policies when the crisis struck. The healthy macro 
stance, the stimulus packages in EM Asia and in the G3, including the 
sharp interest rate cuts, helped EM Asia quickly recover from essentially 
a free fall in trade. However, it is important to emphasize that EM Asia 
has not decoupled from the G3. The double dip in the euro area is weigh-
ing heavily over the region and exports to Europe have now reverted to 
levels observed in late 2010. Moreover, the recent capital outﬂows from 
India and Indonesia show that countries with current account deﬁcits in 
particular are sensitive to changes in foreign investor sentiment.
In spite of the successful crisis management, GDP growth in China is 
trending down partly because of the double dip in the euro area but also 
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reﬂecting diminishing returns to capital accumulation. This also explains 
why the government has been reluctant to curb surging housing prices. 
Because the rental yield from investing in real estate in the big cities is 
signiﬁcantly below bank interest rates, the market seems driven by ex-
pectations of future price increases. The fast credit expansion that took 
place until recently, had the potential to trigger a further surge in real 
estate prices and eventually foster a mega bubble in the market. Due to 
this, over the summer of 2013, the government adopted bold measures 
to rein in the acceleration in credit growth, well aware that this develop-
ment could fuel a boom-bust housing cycle and increase the likelihood 
of a future hard landing. So far the government has demonstrated that 
it has the necessary tools to steer the economy to a softer landing, with 
GDP growth in the range of 7 to 8 per cent. 
Under the new Abe-led government, Japan has implemented a re-
markable new strategy that aims at bringing an end to deﬂation through 
a massive quantitative easing programme, ﬁscal stimulus and a plan 
that aims to boost Japan's competitiveness through reforms in product 
and labour markets. The details of the last element of the plan have not 
yet been revealed.
The hope is to restart Japan's economy through a big devaluation; so 
far the yen is down by around 25 per cent relative to leading curren-
cies. There is evidence that the strategy has started to work. GDP rose 
more strongly in the ﬁrst two quarters of 2013 than previously, mainly 
reﬂecting stronger exports and private consumption. This has fuelled 
expectations of higher proﬁts, which explains the very signiﬁcant in-
crease in the stock market. However, the new strategy is not without 
risks of destabilizing public ﬁnances at home and markets abroad and 
it could also lead to retaliation from competitors. There is, however, a 
signiﬁcant upside potential assuming that Japan will effectively man-
age to reform its rigid labour and product markets. As there has not 
yet been any legislation in this area, it is too early to say whether the 
strategy will be successful in the long term.13
Ole Risager is Professor in International Economics at the Department of 
International Economics and Management, Copenhagen Business School, 
Denmark.
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NOTES
1  I have beneﬁted from comments from participants at an Asia Business Forum Semi-
nar, Copenhagen, 2013 and from discussions with colleagues. I wish in particular 
to thank Michael Jakobsen, Svend E. Hougaard Jensen, Ari Kokko, Niels Mygind, 
Emil Verner and Finn Østrup. I am solely responsible for views and errors in the 
article.
2  See Minsky (1977) for theoretical work on ﬁnancial crises that captures very well 
the 2008 crisis. 
3 See Shiller (2008) for more information on the sub-prime market, including its growth, 
and Risager (2009) for delinquency rates.
4 China's large sovereign wealth fund CIC had, however, invested in Morgan Stanley, 
an investment that also led to substantial losses.          
5 To illustrate let us consider a typical apartment in Beijing in a location between 
the 3rd and 4th ring (highway around the city). These apartments are now sold for 
around RMB 40,000 or more per square meter, according to anecdotal evidence. 
The price for an apartment of around 60 square meters is therefore about RMB 2.5 
million. The gross monthly rent that can be obtained is around RMB 5,000 and the 
net rent is around RMB 4,500 after deduction of association fees, etc. The yield is 
therefore only slightly above 2 per cent. Interest rates on 3-6 month time deposits 
are around 4 per cent.
6   In March 2013, the State Council announced that it will strictly enforce the new 20 per 
cent capital gains tax that is relevant if the apartment for sale has been owned less 
than ﬁve years. The capital gain policy has been adopted in all major cities. Besides 
this rule, Beijing for example also now has a rule that prevents singles from owning 
more than one apartment, whereas families can have two apartments. Foreigners 
cannot buy property in China and Chinese citizens can only buy in Beijing if they 
have lived there for ﬁve years or more. The down payment for the ﬁrst apartment 
is 30 per cent and 70 per cent for the second. Moreover, the ﬁnancing cost for the 
second apartment is 10 percentage points above the normal bank lending rate.
7  Declining loan quality means lower ability to service the loans in SOEs, local 
governments and the private sector, including real estate developers and private 
investors. 
8  The programme is enormous and amounts to buying bonds worth yen 7-8 trillion 
(USD 70-80 billion) each month. Relative to the size of the economy, this is a much 
bigger programme than the US QE-3 programme.
9   Last observation is 28 September 2013. 
10  In this formula, r is the nominal interest rate and g is the nominal GDP growth rate. 
We could also work in real terms: in this case r should be the real interest rate and 
g the real growth rate. Note, the end result for the change in the debt burden is the 
same. 
11 The same goes for Germany.
12  The South Korean ﬁnance minister was quoted in the international press as having 
said that the won's   appreciation against the yen is a larger issue than the ongoing 
conﬂict with North Korea. 
13  After the paper was completed in September 2013, the Abe government announced 
that fundamental labour market reforms, including moving ahead with a more lib-
eral hiring-ﬁring regime in companies, have been taken off the agenda. However, 
since Japan needs to address these issues, it is still highly uncertain whether the Abe 
government can undertake sufﬁcient reforms of the ailing economy. 
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